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Abstract 
 
This paper combines unique survey and experimental data to examine the 
determinants of self-selection into a vocational training program. Women residing 
in selected disadvantaged areas in New Delhi, India were invited to apply for a 6-
month long free training program in stitching and tailoring. A random subset of 
applicants and non-applicants were invited to participate in a set of behavioral 
experiments and in a detailed socio-economic survey. We find that applicants and 
non-applicants differ both in terms of observables (captured using survey data) 
and also in terms of a number of intrinsic traits (captured via the behavioral 
experiments). Overall our results suggest that there is valuable information to be 
gained by dissecting the black box of unobservables using behavioral 
experiments.  
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1. Introduction  
Vocational programs impart hands-on training in skills that are readily marketable. Many 
countries, faced with nagging unemployment on one hand, and increased demand for 
specialized labor in manufacturing and service sectors on the other, have promoted 
vocational training programs (Grubb 2006).1 The economic benefits of participating in such 
training programs have been well studied for developed countries (see Heckman, Lalonde 
and Smith, 1999 for a review) and are now increasingly being assessed using data from 
developing countries (Attanasio, Kugler and Meghir, 2009 and Card, Ibarraran, Regalia, 
Rosas and Soares, 2011). However, the benefits from such vocational training programs 
can only be appropriated if (targeted) individuals volunteer to participate in the program. If 
they shy away from participating in these specialized avenues of skill building, investment 
in such programs would have very little effect on employment and welfare. It is therefore 
crucial to identify the observable socioeconomic and demographic characteristics along 
with intrinsic traits that might influence participation rates.  
Identifying the mechanism underlying self-selection into training programs can be 
important for a number of reasons. First, if fewer individuals choose to apply to these 
programs then the associated benefits of the program could be under estimated.2 Second, 
identifying the selection process can enable us to determine which observable (individual 
and household) characteristics matter in encouraging targeted individuals to apply for 
training programs. This in turn can help policy makers decide on the possible roles of 
subsidies/transfers in the application process (Heckman, 1992). Finally, very little is known 
about the individual level intrinsic traits such as differences in preferences, inherent 
competitiveness and abilities that can potentially influence self-selection into programs. For 
example, individuals who choose to apply to training programs might be more competitive 
and confident than the average non-applicant and ignoring such intrinsic characteristics can 
result in biased program effects.  
                                                            
1 Australia, Finland, England, Germany, Netherlands, Austria, Sweden, Switzerland, Norway, Spain, Hong 
Kong, New Zealand, Paraguay, United States, India, Argentina, Chile, Peru, Uruguay, to name a few. See 
Annex 2 of Bechterman, Olivas and Dar (2004) for a complete list of countries and details on skill building 
and other labor market training programs that they offer. 
2 The power of a test is inversely related to its sample size; if fewer individuals choose to apply, then the 
estimated power of the test will be small and only large gains from the program would be detected.  
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 Our goal in this paper is to examine whether there are systematic differences 
between applicants and non-applicants to a vocational training program in terms of both 
observable and intrinsic characteristics. In order to do this we combine data from primary 
surveys (observational data) and controlled experiments (experimental data). The training 
program that we consider is a free vocational education program in stitching and tailoring 
offered to women who are residents of selected disadvantaged communities in New Delhi; 
are between ages 18 and 39, and have obtained 5 or more grades of schooling.  
To identify the observable differences, we administer a detailed household 
questionnaire. A randomly selected pool of applicants (who volunteered to participate in 
the training) and non-applicants (who were offered the opportunity to participate in the 
training program and declined) were surveyed using the questionnaire. To capture intrinsic 
differences between the applicants and non-applicants, these women were also invited to 
participate in an experiment, where we focused on eliciting risk preferences, attitudes 
towards competition and level of confidence. It is plausible that individuals may vary along 
many additional unobservable dimensions that can influence their choice of participating or 
not participating in the program. However, we argue that the three dimensions mentioned 
above capture several important sources of intrinsic differences that can urge one group to 
participate and another not to participate. Our chosen dimensions can also influence their 
labor market outcomes directly by influencing their wage earnings, and probabilities for 
self- and paid-employment.  
Why choose these specific intrinsic characteristics? First, residents of a developing 
country like India are exposed to a myriad of uncertainties. Incomplete financial markets 
fail to smoothen out economic risks; institutional hurdles make any start-up venture fraught 
with uncertainty and filled with the possibility of complete failure. Understandably, 
investing in any new venture such as a vocational education program involves considerable 
time costs and sometimes even monetary investment. As a result, an individual with a 
higher tolerance to risk might be more willing to invest in such a training program. Often, 
participants in a vocational training program are interested in becoming micro-
entrepreneurs, post-training. Castillo, Petrie and Torrero (2010) provide evidence using 
artefactual field experiments that differences in risk preferences have significant 
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implications for occupational choices. Risk attitudes can also influence adoption of any 
new venture. For example, Liu (2008) finds that more risk averse (or more loss averse) 
farmers in rural China adopt Bt cotton, a relatively newer technological improvement, 
much later. Risk aversion has been found to have a negative effect on investment in higher 
education using survey evidence (see Chen, 2003 and Belzil and Leonardi, 2009). The 
literature hence suggests that in a country where prospects are often risky one should pay 
particular attention to risk attitudes since they can potentially influence the desire to 
participate in not just training programs, but adopting anything new that has an element of 
uncertainty. 
Second, competitive preferences can influence individuals’ self selection into 
programs. Niederle and Versterlund (2007), Gneezy Leonard and List (2009) and 
Andersen, Ertac, Gneezy, List and Maximiano (2010) look at differences in 
competitiveness as a way to explain wage gaps between men and women and the evolution 
of competitiveness as children grow. Intrinsic differences in competitiveness can impact the 
decision to apply for a potentially income enhancing training program. 
Third, confidence and over-confidence can have a significant impact on labor 
market outcomes (Koszegi, 2006, Bénabou and Tirole, 2002). Although, there is relatively 
little evidence on the effect of confidence on labor market outcomes (partly due to the 
difficulty in measuring and obtaining data on confidence reliably), it has been documented 
that the level of confidence can affect wage rates (Fang and Moscarini, 2005), performance 
in financial markets (Biais, Hilton, Mazurier and Pouget, 2005), entrepreneurial behavior 
(Cooper, Woo, and Dunkelberg, 1988; Camerer and Lovallo, 1999; Bernardo and Welch, 
2001; Koellinger, Minniti and Schade, 2007) and can explain the persistence of 
intergenerational inequality in income and education (Filippin and Paccagnella, 2009). The 
connection between confidence levels and entrepreneurial behavior is particularly relevant 
in our context as a large proportion of the applicants to the program want to become micro 
entrepreneurs.   
Our results show that the probability of applying for the training program varies in 
terms of several observable characteristics. We find that younger, Hindu women, with prior 
experience in stitching and tailoring, who belong to households with higher income and 
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higher dependency ratio, and have control over resources have a significantly higher 
probability of applying to the training program offered. The results from the behavioral 
experiment reveal that less risk averse, more competitive and more confident women are 
significantly more likely to apply to the training program. Our findings suggest that 
focusing only on the observable characteristics might not be sufficient to fully explain 
selection into the program; intrinsic traits are important and can conceivably influence take 
up rates in such programs.  
 
2. Methodology 
2.1 Program Design 
The data used in this paper are collected as a part of a baseline survey in an ongoing 
research initiative that uses a randomized control design to examine the impact of 
participating in a voluntary vocational training program (stitching and tailoring services) on 
labor market outcomes. We use detailed demographic and socio-economic information 
along with behavioral data from controlled experiments pertaining to the applicants and 
non-applicants to this program. The program was administered jointly by two non-
governmental organizations (NGOs): Pratham Delhi Education Initiative (PDEI) and Social 
Awakening Through Youth Action (SATYA).   
In June 2010, the program was advertised to all women between 18 and 39 years of 
age who had completed 5 or more grades of schooling, and resided in selected 
disadvantaged areas of the South Shahdara region in New Delhi. See Appendix 3 for the 
location of these areas. A complete census of the selected regions was administered prior to 
the initiation of the program. In the advertisement that followed the census, all potential 
applicants were informed of the location of the training centers (two in the South Shahdara 
region), the extent of commitment required (participants were required to commit up to two 
hours per day in a five-day week), the method of selection (random), course content and the 
expected time-span of the program (6 months, starting August 2010). Finally there was a 
Rs 50 per month deposit for participating in the program (total of Rs 300 for the duration of 
the training program) and women who completed the full program were repaid Rs 350. 
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This was introduced to increase commitment to the program and ensure regular attendance. 
This amount of Rs 50 per month was around 1% of the household income for the 
applicants. Potential applicants were informed of this deposit requirement.     
 A total of 223 women participated in the behavioral experiments. This consisted of 
153 applicants and 69 non-applicants. All participants in the behavioral experiments were 
randomly chosen.3 The experiments were conducted in the Pratham office located in South 
Shahdara, a prominent and convenient place for all the participants. 
 All women who applied to the program (applicants) and the non-applicants who 
participated in the experiments were followed-up at their homes and requested to 
participate in a household survey, which collected detailed information on household 
demographic characteristics, schooling outcomes, assets, employment, labor market 
outcomes (full time and part time employment in the past 30 days), quality of life and 
involvement in decision making within the household.4 We were unable to collect survey 
data on 5% of the applicants and 15% of the non-applicants who participated in the 
behavioral experiments: 7 of the 153 applicants and 11 of the 69 non-applicants could 
either not be traced or did not want to participate in the survey. Hence we have complete 
data for 204 women (146 applicants and 58 non-applicants). Figure 1 presents the summary 
of the program design and the sample sizes for the different groups. We did not find any 
differences in the intrinsic characteristics between subjects who participated in the 
experiments and completed the survey and subjects who only participated in the 
experiments but did not complete the survey (see Table A1 in Appendix 1).5  
                                                            
3 We first decided on the maximum number of participants we wanted for the 12 sessions that we planned to 
conduct in July 2010. This was determined by time and funding constraints. We already had the addresses of 
the applicants. We used this list to randomly invite the applicants. We stopped inviting once the number of 
invitations reached 200. For the non-applicants, we stratified them by the local cluster numbers and within 
each cluster we randomly invited women who satisfied the eligibility criterion. We stopped inviting once the 
number of invitations reached 100. We use the census data (collected prior to advertising the program) to 
compare average grades of schooling and age of all non-applicants with that of non-applicants who 
participated in the behavioral experiment. We find that the two groups have similar average grades of 
schooling completed and age (these are the only two variables on which information was collected in our 
census). This suggests that our non-applicant sample is representative of the non-applicant population..  
4 Due to the length of the household survey, it was not possible to administer the survey during the 
experiment.  
5 If non-response is systematically related to behavioral characteristics that differ between applicants and non-
applicants then our results would potentially suffer from selection bias. To address this concern we estimate a 
probit regression where the dependent variable (non-response) is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if 
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2.2 Experimental Design 
We conducted 12 sessions and each session lasted approximately 2 hours. Each subject 
participated in only one session. The average payment received from participation was Rs 
203 (including a show-up fee of Rs 150).6 The experiments that we conducted fall under the 
category of artefactual field experiments, using the categorization developed by Harrison 
and List (2004).  
Each subject participated in two behavioral games. The first game was designed to 
evaluate subjects’ attitudes towards risk (investment game). In this game, participants were 
endowed with Rs 50 and had the option to allocate any portion of their endowment to a 
risky asset that had a 50% chance of quadrupling the amount invested. The invested amount 
could also be lost with a 50% probability. The subjects retained any amount that they chose 
not to invest.  
The second game was designed to investigate the intrinsic competitiveness of 
subjects (competition game). The subjects were required to participate in a real-effort task, 
which determined their payoffs in the experiment. The real-effort task consisted of filling 
up 1.5 fl oz. zip lock bags with kidney beans (locally known as Rajma) in one minute. Prior 
to the task each subject had to choose one of two possible methods of compensation. They 
could choose a piece-rate compensation method, which depended solely on their own 
performance and they would receive Rs 4 for each correctly filled bag. Alternatively, they 
could choose a competition-rate compensation method where their earnings would depend 
on how they performed relative to a randomly chosen subject in the same session. A subject 
received Rs 16 per bag if she filled more bags than her matched opponent (see section 2.2.1 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
household survey data is missing and 0 otherwise. The explanatory variables include the set of intrinsic traits 
included in specification 3 in Table 3 (see below) and the interaction of these variables with applicant status. 
The results are presented in Table A2 in Appendix 1. None of the variables included in the set of explanatory 
variables (interacted or not) are statistically significant and the interaction terms are also not jointly 
statistically significant. We are therefore assured that non-response is not systematically related to intrinsic 
differences between applicants and non-applicants. 
6 The official minimum wages for unskilled workers in Delhi was Rs 203 per day at the time of running these 
experiments. In practice, most women in our sample would receive less than this amount, since the minimum 
wage legislations are rarely imposed in India. Cardenas and Carpenter (2008, page 331), in their survey of 
field experiments in developing countries argue that paying on average one to two days wage for a half-day 
session seems to create the necessary salience for participants in the field. For a two-hour session that we 
conducted, a day’s worth of wages satisfies this criterion. The exchange rate at the time of running these 
experiments was $1 (US) = Rs 46.   
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for a discussion of the matching process). If she filled fewer bags than her opponent, she 
received nothing. When choosing their compensation method, the subjects also had to guess 
their performance in the game, by answering questions on the number of bags they 
expected to be able to fill, and their expected relative rank based on their performance in 
the task.  
 In each session, only one of the games was chosen for payment purposes. The basic 
structure of each game is similar to the games used in previous studies (for example, 
Gneezy, Leonard and List, 2009). We chose the payoffs such that the returns from choosing 
the riskier alternative were comparable in the two games. In both the games, choosing the 
riskier outcome gave four times higher payoffs compared to the riskless option. Our choice 
of the real-effort task was specific to our field conditions. While we did not want a task that 
might be more familiar to a particular sub-section of our subjects (that could bias their 
expectations about their performance in the game), we had to choose a task that was 
feasible for our subject population. This ruled out many of the familiar experimental tasks 
like computing sums, or word tasks since our participants (and indeed the population they 
are drawn from) are weak in these skills. Kidney beans comprise a staple diet in the region; 
women are used to handling the beans regularly (they take them out in bowls, clean them 
etc.) in the process of cooking and all our participants are likely to be equally familiar with 
this particular task.  
 
2.2.1 Procedure  
Subjects were randomly allocated IDs at the beginning of the session and asked to take a 
seat in one of the two rooms (Room 1 henceforth for expositional purposes). No 
communication was allowed during the session and the participants were informed of this. 
The instructions were read out aloud in Hindi.7 We also used visual aids while reading out 
the instructions, in the form of display charts (see Figures A1 and A2 in Appendix 2). To 
enhance comprehension and minimize anchoring-bias (see Ariely, Loewenstein and Prelec, 
2003) the instructions that were read out had other examples, in addition to the one 
                                                            
7 The instructions were first prepared in English, and then translated into Hindi by a native Hindi speaker. The 
English and Hindi versions were compared and verified for consistency by a person fluent in both Hindi and 
English. The English version of the instructions are presented in Appendix 2. 
  9
displayed in the charts. The instructions for the investment game were read out first and 
after that the subjects were ushered into an adjoining room one-by-one where they made 
their individual allocation decisions in front of one of the experimenters. Prior to making 
their choices, every subject was asked a few questions to ensure her comprehension of the 
game. Once a subject had specified her investment choice, the experimenter asked her to 
elaborate on the reason behind her choice.  
After participants had made their decision for the investment game, they were re-
seated in Room 1 where the instructions for the competition game were read out. Once 
again visual charts were used to explain the process (see Appendix 2). The participants 
were also shown what constituted a correctly filled bag. At the end of the demonstration, 
they were again asked to go one by one to the adjoining room and answer a set of questions 
to ensure their understanding of the game, measure their level of confidence, discover their 
preferred form of compensation (piece-rate or competition rate), and find the reason behind 
their choice of compensation method. Once all participants had answered the questions, 
they were re-seated in Room 1, and given one minute to fill as many zip lock bags as 
possible with the kidney beans provided.  The experimenter announced the closure of the 
task after a minute was over. Next, the number of correctly filled bags for each participant 
was recorded.  
Finally, a coin was tossed in front of the participants which determined the game to 
be used for payment. Participants were paid privately in the adjoining room. If the 
investment game was chosen for payment purposes, a second coin toss determined whether 
the risky project was successful or not. If the competition game was chosen for payment 
purposes and if the participant had chosen the competition rate payment method, she had to 
be matched with one other person in the session for payment. The matching was done as 
follows. The subject was requested to draw one chit from a box containing the IDs of the 
other participants in the session. Her performance was matched to that of the person whose 
ID was drawn. The matched participant need not have chosen the competition rate payment 
method. We were only concerned with the output of the matched partner. The participants 
were informed of this process beforehand. 
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While the same (female) experimenter read the instructions out aloud in every 
session, the questions were administered by two or three experimenters, depending on 
availability.8 Several of our subjects, despite having completed 5 or more grades of 
schooling, had poor reading and writing skills.9 The experimenters were therefore required 
to be actively involved in administering the questions and noting down the responses. Such 
a protocol clearly reduced the social distance between the subject and the experimenter, and 
could conceivably create scrutiny effects. It is useful to point out here that our main interest 
lies in the differences in the responses of applicants and non-applicants, and as long as any 
one of the groups is not systematically more affected by the scrutiny effect, any potential 
bias arising from the scrutiny effect will be differenced out. The fact that the decisions 
taken in the games were not hypothetical and influenced by non-trivial monetary amounts, 
reinforced the contention that subject choices are minimally affected by social distance, and 
hence the choices should be viewed as real investment decisions. We think that our method 
is particularly relevant for field experiments run in developing countries where 
participating subjects might not have sufficient reading and writing skills. 
The games were always run in the same order (i.e., the investment game, followed 
by the competition game), no feedback was provided to the subjects in between the two 
games and subjects were paid on the basis of the outcomes in one of the two tasks, 
randomly determined after all participants had finished participating in both games. The 
only task that a subject received any feedback for was the one for which they were paid. 
While the particular design choice meant that we cannot explicitly test for order effects, we 
anticipate that these effects would be minimized by paying for one game, with no feedback 
between games. Paying for one game also helped reduce wealth effects.  
 
3. Results 
3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
                                                            
8 An analysis of responses indicates that there are no differences depending on the gender of the experimenter 
administering the questions.  
9 Even with recent advances in overall educational attainment in India, as of 2005 half the children enrolled in 
grade five could not read (and write) grade two level text (see the 2005 Annual Status of Education Report). 
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We start our analysis by discussing the demographic differences between the applicants and 
non-applicants gathered through our survey. Table 1 presents average individual and 
household characteristics for the sample of applicants and non-applicants. We also report t-
tests for the mean differences in these characteristics. We find that program applicants are 
younger, are less likely to belong to the other backward class (OBC),10 have some prior 
experience of tailoring and stitching, come from relatively higher income households and 
are less likely to be happy at home. Of the 132 applicants who responded to this question, 
52% reported that the main reason for applying to the program is to “increase future 
employment prospects”, followed by “like stitching” (24%) and “will help with 
housework” (24%). We also find that 47% of the applicants (22% of the non-applicants) 
are wives of the head of the household, 70% of the applicants (23% of the non-applicants) 
are daughters of the head of the household and finally 19% of the applicants (10% of the 
non-applicants) are daughters-in-law of the head of the household.  
 To measure respondents’ level of economic freedom as well as control over 
household resources, we asked in the survey whether the subject was able to choose/decide 
how to spend the money she has earned. We construct a variable “control over resources” 
that takes the value 1 if the respondent says yes and zero otherwise. We find that women 
with greater control over resources are significantly more likely to apply to the program. 
We also include an indicator for participation in a chit fund as an alternative measure of 
control over resources and using this measure, we find that while women with membership 
in a chit fund are more likely to apply to the program, the coefficient estimate is not 
statistically significant.11 
Table 2 reveals some interesting differences in intrinsic characteristics between the 
program applicants and non-applicants. Figure 2 presents the proportion of women 
choosing to allocate Rs x to the risky investment in the investment game, where x ∈ {0, 1 – 
10, 11 – 20, 21 – 30, 31 – 40, 41 – 50}. Approximately 58% of the applicants allocate more 
                                                            
10 The Central Government of India classifies some of its citizens based on their social and economic 
condition as Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Other Backward Class (OBC). 
11 Anderson and Baland (2002) propose an explanation of membership of roscas in Kenya (similar to chit 
funds in India) based on conflictual interactions within the household. In their paper, participation in a rosca is 
a strategy a wife employs to protect her savings against claims by her husband for immediate consumption. 
So membership in a chit fund/rosca could be viewed as a measure of bargaining power of the woman.  
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than Rs 20 to the risky investment, compared to 43% of the non-applicants. If we use the 
amount invested in the risky asset as a measure of aversion to risk, then applicants appear 
to be less risk averse than non-applicants. The cumulative density function of the amount 
invested in the risky asset by applicants lies generally to the right of that of the non-
applicants though clearly there is no stochastic dominance (Figure 3). Alternatively, the 
amount invested in the game can also be interpreted as a subject’s attitude towards loss 
aversion. Our results suggest that applicants are less loss-averse than the non-applicants.  
In the competition game though, 36.3% of the applicants and 36.2% of the non-
applicants choose to be paid according to the competition rate, suggesting no difference in 
the attitude towards competition between the two groups (Figure 4). To further investigate 
behavior in this game, we construct two measures of confidence: an absolute measure of 
confidence which is the subject’s estimate about the number of bags she would be able to 
fill in one minute, and a relative measure of confidence, which is the subject’s estimate 
about her relative standing (rank) vis-à-vis other participants in the session. Applicants in 
our sample appear to be more confident than the non-applicants using our measures of 
confidence (Table 2 and Figures 5 and 6). For example, Figure 5 shows that 52% of the 
non-applicants expected to fill more than 10 bags whereas more than 64% of the applicants 
thought they would do the same. These differences are however not statistically significant. 
The actual performance of non-applicants in the game (measured by the number of bags 
filled) was slightly better on an average (Table 2 and Figure 7). As figure 7 shows 81% of 
the non-applicants filled more than 2 bags as compared to 70% of applicants. This 
difference is not statistically significant. 
We construct a third measure of confidence – confidence ratio — defined as the 
ratio of the number of bags the subject expects to fill to the number of bags she actually 
fills. Notice this ratio will be 1, if someone has realistic expectations about her 
performance, greater than 1 if someone is overconfident, and less than 1 if someone is 
under-confident. We find women in our sample to be overwhelmingly overconfident. Only 
few women are realistic or under-confident. As Table 2 shows, applicants appear to be 
more overconfident compared to non-applicants and the difference is statistically 
significant. Figure 8 presents the cumulative density function of this measure of confidence 
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by applicant status. While this function for the applicants lies to the right of that of non-
applicants, the null hypothesis of no stochastic dominance cannot be rejected (p-value = 
0.387). 
Several other points are worth noting. First, the results presented in Table 2 suggest 
that the non-applicants are more likely to be unsure of their ability compared to the 
applicants. This is despite the fact that in the actual task they perform better (though the 
difference is not statistically significant). Second, in addition to eliciting competitive 
behavior, “competitiveness” can perhaps capture underlying preferences for a strategic risk. 
Choosing the competition rate as opposed to the piece-rate payment scheme can potentially 
be a risky alternative since payoffs in this case depend on the relative performance and not 
absolute performance. We can therefore elicit two types of risk through our behavioral 
games. In the investment game the subject faces exogenous risk that is beyond her control, 
while in the competition game she faces risk that depends on her own performance, relative 
to that of other subjects. We do not find any systematic relationship between the risk 
category (as defined in Figure 2) and choice of the competition payment scheme in the 
competition game. Third, the choice of the payment scheme has a significant effect on 
performance in the real-effort task. The average number of bags filled in one minute by 
women choosing the piece-rate compensation method is 2.8, compared to 3.05 for women 
who choose the competition-rate compensation method and this difference is statistically 
significant (p-value = 0.014).12 Finally, we find that women who choose the competition-
rate compensation method are significantly more likely to place themselves at a higher rank 
within the group (correlation coefficient is 0.18 with a p-value = 0.007). This is not 
surprising, since in the competition-rate compensation method, they will earn a positive 
amount only if they fill more bags than their competitor and it seems logical to expect that a 
woman is likely to choose this method of compensation only if she believes herself to be 
better than others in the group. The choice of the compensation method is however not 
affected by their expectation of the number of bags they are likely to fill in the allotted one 
minute.  
                                                            
12 There is however no difference in the between-subject variance in the number of bags filled in the allotted 
one minute depending on the compensation method chosen. There is therefore no evidence that sorting based 
on choice of the payment mechanism is efficiency enhancing unlike in Eriksson, Teyssier and Villeval (2009).  
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3.2 Regression results 
We next estimate a multivariate regression model to capture the causal effects of the 
behavioral variables on the decision to apply to the program, controlling for the observable 
demographic characteristics. A probit model is estimated to characterize the determinants 
of program participation. The marginal effects and robust standard errors are reported in 
Table 3. Results corresponding to three different specifications are presented. In 
specification 1, we include only socio-economic characteristics obtained from the survey. 
In specification 2 we include the proportion of endowment allocated to the risky asset in the 
investment game and choice of the competitive wage scheme in the competition game as 
additional controls. Finally in specification 3 we also control for confidence (measured by 
the confidence ratio). Specifications 2 and 3, in addition control for the actual performance 
in the real effort task (number of bags filled in the allotted one minute).  
Including the intrinsic traits substantially improves the fit of the model as compared 
to specification 1, which only includes the observable variables. The predicted probability, 
the pseudo R-squared and the log likelihood are all higher in specifications 2 and 3. The 
behavioral variables are always jointly statistically significant in explaining applicant 
status. Our final preferred specification is reported in column 3 in Table 3, which includes 
the full set of observable and intrinsic traits.   
Applicants and non-applicants differ along many observable characteristics. We 
find that age, religion and caste have an important role in explaining applicant status. 
Younger women are more likely to apply to the program: an additional year in age is 
associated with a 3 percentage point reduction in the probability of applying to the 
program. Hindu women are 35 percentage points more likely to apply to the program. 
Women belonging to the Other Backward Class (OBC) are 27 percentage points less likely 
to apply to the program. Married women are also more likely to apply to the program 
though this variable is not statistically significant.    
Women who have completed secondary schooling are 11 percentage points less 
likely to apply for the program. This indicates that the opportunity cost of participating in 
such a program is considerably higher for more educated women, who may have better 
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outside options. The process of reforms in India over the last two decades have opened up 
significant opportunities for individuals with the right kinds of skills and educated women 
have benefitted the most from this (Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2006). Our results support 
this argument. Women with some prior experience in tailoring and stitching are 37 
percentage points more likely to apply to the program.  
Although the training program was administered free of cost, participation in the 
program needed significant time commitment, which can appear to the subjects as a high 
opportunity cost. To investigate further whether that is indeed the case, we include the 
variable dependency ratio, defined as the ratio of the number of children under 5 in a 
household and the number of adult females in the household. Conceivably, the dependency 
ratio can influence behavior in two different ways. First, since women are typically the 
primary care-givers for children, a woman belonging to a household which has relatively 
more children compared to the available adult women faces a substantially higher time-cost 
of participating in the training program.  In this case an increase in the dependency ratio 
will urge a participant to substitute away from the training program, and hence reduce the 
probability of applying to the program. On the other hand, it is often the case that in our 
subject-demographics, it is the woman’s responsibility to find the resources required to 
send children to school or take them to a doctor/hospital when they are sick. In this socio-
economic set up it is not surprising then to find that most applicants report that the primary 
reason for applying to the program is to increase future income. Here, an increase in 
dependency ratio would put more pressure on the adult woman to seek out additional ways 
to support household income. We would then expect a positive relation between the 
increase in the dependency ratio and the probability of applying to the program due to the 
underlying income-earning motive. Which of the two effects is stronger is an empirical 
question. In our sample, we find that the income effect dominates the substitution effect. 
Applicants are likely to belong to economically better families. In our sample, a Rs 
1000 increase in household income increases the probability of applying to the program by 
10 percentage points. Majority of our applicants hope to set up small businesses. This 
would typically require initial capital investment. It is therefore no surprise that most of the 
applicants were from a relatively richer household. We also find that women who have 
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control over resources (i.e. are able to choose how to spend money) are 42 percentage 
points more likely to apply to participate in the program. Being a member of a chit fund has 
a positive but not a statistically significant effect on the probability of applying to the 
program. We also notice that women who are happier at home are less likely to apply to the 
program, though this variable is not statistically significant.  
Turning to the effects of the intrinsic traits, we find that women who are less risk 
averse (or are loss averse), more competitive and more confident of their ability are more 
likely to apply to the vocational training program. A one-percent increase in the proportion 
of the endowment allocated to the risky asset in the investment game is associated with a 
0.22 percentage point increase in the probability of applying to the program. Women who 
choose the competitive wage scheme in the competition game are 13 percentage points 
more likely to apply to the program. A unit increase in the confidence ratio is associated 
with a 4 percentage point increase in the probability of applying to the program.  
We control for performance in the task to capture participant’s display of effort in 
the game. Interestingly it is the non-applicants who perform better in this specific real effort 
task with an additional bag filled in the real effort task, being associated with a 11 
percentage points decrease in the probability of applying to the program.13  
While most of the coefficient estimates are similar across the different 
specifications, failure to include the intrinsic traits in the regressions is associated with an 
omitted variable bias. For example, in specification 1 women belonging to OBC are 13 
percentage points less likely to apply for the program and this effect is not statistically 
significant. This effect increases to 27 percentage points in specification 3 (a doubling of 
the effect) and is significant. Similarly a subject who has completed secondary school is 9.5 
percentage point less likely to apply for the program (not statistically significant) in 
specification 1 and 11 percentage points more likely to apply in specification 3 (statistically 
significant).  
 
                                                            
13 The number of bags actually filled variable loses its statistical significance in specification 3. This is 
because ability enters indirectly through the confidence ratio variable. We re-ran specification 3 by excluding 
the number of bags actually filled from the set of explanatory variables. The results are similar to those 
reported in specification 3.  
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 3.3. Robustness 
We estimate several alternative specifications to ensure that the findings presented in Table 
3 are robust. We discuss four robustness tests in this section. First, in specifications 1 and 2 
in Table 4 we include alternative measures of confidence: self-assessment of the number of 
bags they could fill in the real effort task (specification 1) and perceived rank within the 
group (specification 2). In these two specifications we do not include confidence ratio as an 
additional explanatory variable. A unit increase in the number of bags the woman expects 
to be able to fill is associated with a 1.3 percentage points increase in the probability of 
applying for the program; a unit increase in the perceived rank within the group is 
associated with a 2.4 percentage point increase in the probability of applying for the 
program (though in this case the effect is not statistically significant). The rest of the results 
remain qualitatively similar.  
 Second, in specification 3 we include time preference as an additional control (the 
rest of the explanatory variables are as in specification 3 in Table 3). The rate at which an 
individual discounts future pay-offs can influence the decision to be an applicant to the 
program. Returns from a vocational training program (and indeed from all educational 
programs) require a gestation lag to bear fruit (see for example Ray (2003) and 
Mullainathan (2005) for a discussion on how present bias can shape schooling decisions). It 
is possible that women who have a higher discount rate (are more present biased) might 
tend to discount the future returns from the program more heavily and choose not to apply. 
We capture time preference using a question in our household survey: the respondent is 
asked to choose between a sure prize of Rs 100 today versus Rs 150 one month from today. 
The variable present bias takes the value of 1 if the respondent chooses Rs 100 today.14 The 
results from specification 3 in Table 4 show that while the coefficient of the present bias 
dummy is in the expected direction, it is not statistically significant and the inclusion of this 
                                                            
14 There are different ways of capturing this present bias. Our measure of present bias is based on 
hypothetical choices. In recent years, a number of experiments have been conducted to capture present bias 
using monetary incentives (see for example Harrison, Lau and Williams, 2002). Alternatively membership in 
a chit fund could be viewed as a commitment device; women who are members of a chit fund are likely to be 
less present biased. 
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variable does not have any effect on the other explanatory variables (compare specification 
3 in Tables 3 and 4). 
Third, our sample composition has some imbalance: the estimating sample consists 
of 58 non-applicants and 146 applicants. To examine if our results are sensitive to this 
imbalance, we re-run our preferred specification on a new sample, which consists of the 
non-applicants and a randomly chosen subset of the applicants. The estimating sample here 
consists of 58 non-applicants and 47 applicants.15 These results are reported in specification 
4 in Table 4. We find that our results are qualitatively very similar though the magnitude of 
the coefficient estimates and the standard errors are higher.16  
 Fourth, women in the sample reside in a number of different clusters (within the 
South Shahdara area of New Delhi). The presence of common cluster level unobservables 
could lead to incorrect inference. The most common solution for this would be to compute 
the cluster robust standard errors. The difficulty in our case is that the number of clusters 
from which our sample is drawn is small (only 11 in our sample), and therefore simply 
clustering the standard errors would not address this issue (see Woolridge, 2003). An 
alternative would be to estimate a linear probability model with cluster fixed effects and 
robust standard errors. This allows us to account for common cluster level unobservables. 
The corresponding estimates are reported in specification 5 in Table 4. We find that the 
magnitude and sign of all the coefficient estimates are similar and not different from our 
preferred estimates reported in specification 3 in Table 3. 
  
4. Discussion 
This paper uses a novel design that combines household survey data with unique 
experimental data to examine the determinants of self-selection into vocational training 
programs. Our approach allows us to identify both observable and selected intrinsic 
                                                            
15 Recall this data was collected as a part of a randomized training program and the applicants were randomly 
allocated into a control and a treatment group. The treatment group received the free 6 month training while 
the control group did not. These 47 applicants form the randomly chosen control group.  
16 As an alternative sampling methodology, we drew repeated random samples of size 58 from the set of 
applicants and re-ran the regressions on the randomly selected sample of applicants and the set of non-
applicants. The results (available on request) are very similar to those presented in specification 4 in Table 4. 
 
  19
characteristics that separate the applicants from the non-applicants in our training program. 
We find that younger Hindu women, with prior experience in stitching and tailoring, 
belonging to households with higher income and dependency ratio and having control over 
resources have a significantly higher probability of applying to the training program 
offered. The results from our behavioral experiment reveal that women who are less risk 
averse, more competitive and more confident are more likely to apply to the training 
program.  
There are several implications of our results. First, identifying the specific sources 
of intrinsic traits can help researchers address the selection issue better by specifically 
controlling for these characteristics instead of including them in the black box called 
unobservables. However there might be other intrinsic traits such as differences in 
motivation that can differ between applicants and non-applicants. Examining those is 
beyond the scope of this paper and is left for future research. Second, if treatment effects 
were to vary due to differences in intrinsic traits then adding baseline behavioral data can 
help us account for heterogenous treatment effects. Third, the inclusion and better 
measurement of these intrinsic traits can inform policy makers how to frame and advertise 
new policies aimed to improve participation rates. For example, results from this paper 
suggest that risk perceptions can influence take up rates in a program. Any program, which 
is perceived as being risky might face lower take up rates. In such a case providing better 
information about the success of the training program can affect the risk perception and the 
associated participation rate.  
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Table 1: Summary Statistics on Socioeconomic Characteristics 
Variables Full 
sample 
(1) 
Applicants 
 
(2) 
Non-
applicants 
(3) 
Difference 
[(2)-(3)] 
(4) 
Age in years 
 
24.57 
(6.69) 
23.74 
(5.93) 
26.66 
(7.99) 
-2.91*** 
(1.02) 
Married  0.49 
(0.50) 
0.47 
(0.50) 
0.55 
(0.50) 
-0.07 
(0.07) 
Completed secondary school (class 10 in India) 0.43 
(0.49)
0.42 
(0.49)
0.44 
(0.50) 
-0.02 
(0.07)
OBC 0.10 
(0.30) 
0.07 
(0.26) 
0.17 
(0.38) 
-0.10** 
(0.04) 
Hindu 0.97 
(0.16) 
0.97 
(0.14) 
0.94 
(0.22) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
Experience in stitching/tailoring 0.37 
(0.48)
0.48 
(0.50)
0.08 
(0.28) 
0.40*** 
(0.06)
Happy at home (=1 if very happy and 0 if very 
unhappy) 
1.66 
(0.91) 
1.56 
(0.80) 
1.90 
(1.11) 
-0.34*** 
(0.13) 
Household Income excluding Respondent Income 6969.96 
(6624.57) 
7505.97 
(6947.07) 
5620.69 
(5561.70) 
1885.28* 
(1022.18) 
Dependency Ratio (no. of children under 5 years 
divided by the no. of adult females) 
0.31 
(0.51) 
0.35 
(0.55) 
0.22 
(0.38) 
0.12 
(0.07) 
Control over resources 0.57 
(0.49) 
0.67 
(0.47) 
0.34 
(0.47) 
0.33*** 
(0.07) 
Member of chit fund 0.10 
(0.31) 
0.13 
(0.33) 
0.05 
(0.22) 
0.07 
(0.04) 
Sample size 204 146 58  
In columns 1, 2 and 3, standard deviation reported in parenthesis and in column 4, standard error in 
parenthesis. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 2: Summary Statistics on Behavioral Outcomes 
 
Variables Full 
sample 
(1) 
Applicants 
 
(2) 
Non-
applicants 
(3) 
Difference 
[(2)-(3)] 
(4) 
Amount allocated to the risky option in Investment 
Game  
24.86 
(10.69) 
25.37 
(10.22) 
23.56 
(11.80) 
1.80 
(1.65) 
Proportion allocated to the risky option in the 
Investment Game 
49.72 50.75 47.13 3.61 
(21.39) (20.44) (23.60) (3.31) 
Self-assessment of number of bags they could fill in 
Competition Game 
11.43 
(4.44) 
11.71 
(4.14) 
10.72 
(5.09) 
0.98 
(0.68) 
Perceived rank within group (1 = Lowest, 5 = 
Highest) 
4.04 
(1.01) 
4.08 
(1.00) 
3.96 
(1.02) 
0.11 
(0.15) 
Competitive wage scheme in Competition Game 0.64 
(0.48) 
0.63 
(0.48) 
0.62 
(0.48) 
0.01 
(0.07) 
Number of bags actually filled 2.89 
(0.71) 
2.82 
(0.70) 
3.06 
(0.72) 
-0.24** 
(0.10) 
Confidence ratio 4.23 
(2.17) 
4.48 
(2.25) 
3.61 
(1.82) 
0.86*** 
(0.32) 
Sample Size 204 146 58  
In columns 1, 2, and 3 standard deviations are reported in parenthesis and in column 4, standard error in 
parenthesis. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 3: Determinants of Applicant Status: Marginal Effects from Probit Regression 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Observables (Socioeconomic Characteristics):    
Age -0.025*** -0.024*** -0.029*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
Completed secondary school -0.095 -0.097 -0.11* 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) 
OBC -0.132 -0.169 -0.27** 
 (0.14) (0.13) (0.14)
Hindu 0.44*** 0.37*** 0.35*** 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.16) 
Experienced in tailoring and stitching 0.37*** 0.38*** 0.37***
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Family income excluding own income × 10-4 0.10* 0.112** 0.10** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Married  0.08 0.093 0.13 
 (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) 
Dependency Ratio 0.14** 0.12** 0.126**
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Happy at family -0.034 -0.017 -0.014 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Control over resources 0.36*** 0.38*** 0.42*** 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) 
Member of chit fund 0.10 0.11 0.11
 (0.07) (0.05) (0.04) 
Intrinsic Traits (Behavioral Outcomes):    
Proportion Allocated to Risky Asset in Investment Game × 10-2 0.21 0.22*
  (0.13) (0.12) 
Competitive wage scheme in Competition Game  0.14** 0.13*** 
 (0.05) (0.04)
Number of bags actually filled  -0.11*** -0.04 
  (0.04) (0.04) 
Confidence ratio   0.04*** 
   (0.016) 
Sample Size 204 204 204 
Predicted Probability 0.82 0.85 0.87 
Pseudo R-squared 0.38 0.43 0.47 
Log Likelihood -75.94 -69.19 -65.03 
Joint Significance (Behavioral variables)  11.97*** 19.52*** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses        
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4: Robustness  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Probit-ME Probit-ME Probit-ME Probit-ME LPM 
Observables (Socioeconomic Characteristics):      
Age -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.06*** -0.03*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Completed secondary school -0.10 -0.10 -0.11* -0.08 -0.09* 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.13) (0.05) 
OBC -0.21* -0.17 -0.27** -0.22 -0.24** 
 (0.14) (0.12) (0.14) (0.15) (0.09) 
Hindu 0.35*** 0.39*** 0.35*** 0.13 0.15 
 (0.15) (0.13) (0.16) (0.17) (0.13) 
Experienced in tailoring and stitching 0.38*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.72*** 0.31*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) 
Family income excluding own income × 10-4 0.10* 0.11** 0.10** 0.25** 0.01** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.10) (0.00) 
Married  0.11 0.10 0.13 0.19 0.11* 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.18) (0.08) 
Dependency Ratio 0.12** 0.12* 0.126** 0.25 0.08 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.18) (0.05) 
Happy at family -0.013 -0.017 -0.014 -0.06 -0.03 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) 
Control over resources 0.39*** 0.37*** 0.42*** 0.40*** 0.31*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.13) (0.05) 
Member of chit fund 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.33 0.07 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.24) (0.07) 
Intrinsic Traits (Behavioral Outcomes):      
Proportion Allocated to Risky Asset in Investment Game × 10-2 0.21 0.19 0.22* 0.55* 0.14 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.33) (0.13) 
Competitive wage scheme in Competition Game 0.13*** 0.12** 0.13*** 0.30** 0.13** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.14) (0.05) 
Number of bags actually filled -0.12*** -0.11** -0.04 -0.13 -0.018 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.12) (0.04) 
Self-assessment of number of bags they could fill in Competition Game 0.013**    
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 (0.006)    
Perceived rank within group (1 = Lowest, 5 = Highest)  0.024   
  (0.02)    
      
Present Bias   -0.03   
   (0.05)   
Confidence ratio   0.04*** 0.08** 0.04*** 
   (0.016) (0.04) (0.01) 
Sample Size 204 204 204 105 204 
Predicted Probability 0.86 0.85 0.87 0.43  
Pseudo R-squared 0.44 0.43 0.47 0.46  
R-squared     0.45 
Log Likelihood -67.06 -68.85 -64.29 -39.28  
Joint Significance (Behavioral variables) 17.26*** 12.36*** 20.38*** 11.93** 3.70*** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.             
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Specifications 1 – 4 present the marginal effects from probit regressions. 
In specification 5 we replicate the estimates presented in specification 3 from Table 3, except now we include slum fixed effects. 
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Figure 1: Project Summary  
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Figure 2: Amount Allocated to the Risky Asset, by Applicant Status 
 
 
 
Note: Risk categories: 1= Rs 0; 2 = Rs 1 – 10; 3 = Rs 11 – 20; 4 = Rs 21 – 30; 5 = Rs 31 – 40; 6 = Rs 41 
– 50. The risk categories capture the amount invested in the lottery, that is, risky asset.
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Figure 3: CDF Percentage Invested in Risky Asset, by Applicant Status 
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Figure 4: Competitive Wage Scheme in Competition Game, by Applicant Status 
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Figure 5: Self Assessment of Number of Bags they expect to fill, by Applicant Status 
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Figure 6: Perceived Rank Within Group by Applicant Status 
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Figure 7: Number of Bags Actually Filled, by Applicant Status 
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Figure 8: CDF of Confidence, by Applicant Status 
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Appendix 1:  
 
Table A1: Summary Statistics of Behavioral Outcomes by Missing and Non-missing Survey Data 
 Sample 
without 
missing 
survey 
data 
(1)
Sample 
with 
missing 
survey 
data 
(2) 
Difference 
[1-2] 
 
 
(3) 
Amount allocated to the risky option in Investment Game  24.86 
(10.69) 
24.44 
(10.55) 
0.41 
(2.62) 
Proportion allocated to the risky option in the Investment Game 49.72 
(21.39) 
48.88 
(21.11) 
0.83 
(5.25) 
Self-assessment of number of bags they could fill in 
Competition Game 
11.43 
(4.44) 
11.00 
(3.85) 
0.43 
(1.08) 
Perceived rank within group (1 = Lowest, 5 = Highest) 4.04 
(1.01) 
3.88 
(1.18) 
0.16 
(0.25) 
Piece-rate wage scheme in Competition Game 0.65 
(0.48) 
0.72 
(0.46) 
-0.08 
(0.11) 
Number of bags actually filled 2.89 
(0.71) 
3.00 
(1.02) 
-0.10 
(0.18) 
Confidence 4.23 
(2.17) 
3.85 
(1.33) 
0.37 
(0.52) 
Sample Size 204 18  
In columns 1 and 2, standard deviation reported in parenthesis and in column 3, standard error in parenthesis. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table A2: Non-Response in Surveys: Marginal Effects from Probit Regressions 
 
 Covariates Non-response
Proportion allocated to the risky option in the Investment Game (× 10-2) 
 
0.0097 
(0.096) 
Competitive wage scheme in Competition Game 
 
-0.028 
(0.048) 
Number of bags actually filled -0.00008 
(0.036) 
Confidence 0.0088 
(0.010) 
Applicant status (=1 if applicant) 
 
-0.074 
(0.26) 
Proportion allocated to the risky option in the Investment Game × Applicant 
status 
0.0004 
(0.0013) 
Competitive wage scheme in Competition Game × Applicant status 
 
-0.0014 
(0.06) 
Number of bags actually filled × Applicant status 
 
-0.010 
(0.05) 
Confidence × Applicant status 
 
-0.019 
(0.016) 
Observations 222 
Robust standard errors in parentheses        
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Non-response is defined as a dummy variable which takes a value 1 if missing information on household 
questionnaire data and zero otherwise. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
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Appendix 2: English Version of the Subject Instructions 
 
General Instructions 
Player ID #: __________________________ 
Thank you for your participation. You will be paid Rs. 150 for your participation. There 
are 2 tasks that we will ask you to participate in. Performing each task can win you 
more money in cash, in addition to the guaranteed Rs. 150.  
Although, each of you will complete both the tasks, only one of them will be chosen for 
payments. I will toss a coin at the end of the two tasks in front of everyone to determine 
the task you will be paid for. Note that everyone will be paid according to their 
performances in the task determined by the coin toss. 
We are about to begin the first task. Please listen carefully. It is important that you 
understand the rules of the task properly. If you do not understand, you will not be able 
to participate effectively. We will explain the task and go through some examples 
together. There is to be no talking or discussion of the task amongst you. There will be 
opportunities to ask questions to be sure that you understand how to perform each task. 
At any time whilst you are waiting during this experiment, please remain seated, and do 
not do anything unless instructed by the experimenter. Also do not look at others 
responses at any time during this experiment. 
Finally, each page has an ID# on it. Do not show this ID# to any other participant or 
allow it to be visible to anyone during or after this experiment.  
If you are ready, then we will proceed.  
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Instructions for the Investment Game 
Player ID #: __________________________ 
We are about to begin the first task. Please listen carefully to the instructions. 
In this task, you are provided Rs.50. You have the opportunity to invest a portion of this 
amount (between Rs.0 and Rs.50). No money will be given at this point. All actual 
payments will be made at the end of the experiment if this task is chosen as the one that 
you will be paid for. 
 
The investment:  
There is an equal chance that the investment will fail or succeed. If the investment fails, 
you lose the amount you invested. If the investment succeeds, you receive 4 times the 
amount invested. 
 
How do we determine the outcome of the investment: 
After you have chosen how much you wish to invest, you will toss a coin to determine 
whether your investment has failed or succeeded, if this task is chosen for payment. If 
the coin comes up heads, you win four times the amount you chose to invest. If it comes 
up tails, you lose the amount invested. You will toss the coin at the end of the 
experiment, when you come to collect your payment. 
 
Here are some examples: 
 
1. You choose to invest nothing. You will get Rs.50 for sure if this task is chosen 
for payment. 
2. You choose to invest all of the Rs.50. Then if the coin comes up heads, you get 
Rs.200. If the coin comes up tails, you get Rs.0. 
3. You choose to invest Rs.30. Then if the coin comes up heads, you get 30x4=120 
from your investment, plus Rs. 20 left from your initial amount. So you will 
receive a total of Rs.140. However, if the coin comes up tails, you will get 
nothing from the 30 rupees that you invested. So in this situation you will only 
get Rs.20 left from the initial amount that you chose not to invest. 
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Do you have any questions? If you are ready, we will proceed.   
We will call each of you one at a time in the adjoining areas where you will be asked a 
few questions and participate in the described task.  
Once you have finished the task, you will go back to your sitting area. Please make sure 
that you do not converse with anyone. If we find you conversing you will be 
disqualified from further participation and escorted out by one of the experimenters. 
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Decision Sheet for the Investment Game 
 
 
Please complete the example below: 
 
1. If you choose to invest Rs 15 and the coin toss comes up heads, what 
will you receive? 
Rs______ x ______ = Rs______ 
 
 Actual Decision: 
2. Amount that I wish to invest: _______________________ 
 
3. Reason for this decision: 
 
  
Player ID #: __________________________ 
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Instructions for the Competition Game 
Player ID #: __________________________ 
We are about to begin the next task. Please listen carefully to the instructions. All the 
money that you earn from this task is yours to keep and will be given to you at the end 
of this experiment if this task is chosen as the one that you will be paid for.  
 
For this Task, you will be asked to fill bags with Rajma beans and seal it so its contents 
remain securely inside. We will give a demonstration before you start the task. 
You will be given 1 minute to fill up as many bags as you can. Only bags filled and 
properly sealed will be counted towards your payments.  
You can choose one of two payment options for this task. 
Option 1: 
If you choose this option, you get Re. 4 for each bag that you fill properly in 1 minute.  
Option 2: 
If you choose this option, you will be randomly paired with another person and your 
payment depends on your performance relative to that of the person that you are paired 
with. If you fill up more bags properly than the person you are paired with, you will 
receive Rs.16 per bag that you filled. If you both fill the same number of bags you will 
receive Rs. 16 per bag. If you fill up less number of bags than the person you are paired 
with, you will receive Rs. 0. 
Note that what you will earn does not depend on the decision of the person that you are 
paired with; it only depends on your own choice of payment, your performance and 
their performance. 
Here are some examples of what could happen: 
1) You choose option 1. You fill 10 bags properly. You will receive 10xRe. 4 = Rs. 
40. 
2) You choose option 2. You fill 3 bags properly. The person that you are paired 
with fills 2 bags properly. You will receive 3xRs.16 = Rs. 48.  
3) You choose option 2. You fill 3 bags properly. The person that you are paired 
with fills 4 bags properly. You will receive 3 x 0 = Rs. 0. 
 
Note that these are examples only. The actual decision is up to you. 
The rest of the task will proceed as follows: 
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Next, we will call each of you one at a time in the adjoining area where you will be 
asked a few questions and choose your preferred option in the above described task. 
Once you have answered the questions and indicated your preferred option, you will 
come back to your sitting area. Please make sure that you do not converse with anyone 
at this time. If we find you conversing you will be disqualified from further 
participation and escorted out by one of the experimenters. 
Once everyone is back to the seating area we will announce the start of the task and you 
can start filling up the bags. We will make an announcement when there are 30 seconds 
remaining. When time is up, we will say, “Stop the task now”. You should immediately 
stop filling the bags. Please make sure that your hands are in your lap now and not 
touching any of the bags that you filled up. If you do not do this within 2 seconds, you 
will receive Rs. 0 for the entire experiment.  
We will come around and inspect the bags and record the number of bags filled each of 
you managed to fill up.  
Once all counting is done we will flip a coin to decide which of the two tasks will be 
chosen for payments.  
After the coin toss, each of you will be again called one at a time to the adjoining area 
for the final payment procedures. 
 
Are there any questions before we begin? If you are ready, we will proceed.  
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Decision Sheet for the Competition Game 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Player ID #: ____________________ 
 
Questions for Task # 2  
Please answer the following questions: 
 
1. Suppose you choose Option 1. You complete 11 bags correctly at the end of 1 minute. How 
much money do you receive? 
_______ x Rs________ = ________________ 
 
2. Suppose you choose Option 2. You complete 7 bags correctly. The person you are paired with 
completes 6 bags correctly. How much money do you receive? 
_______ x Rs________ = ________________ 
 
3. How many bags do you think you can fill properly in 1 minute? 
_____________________ 
4. If we were to rank everyone’s performance, in the group of people in this room, from best to 
worst, where do you think you would fall compared to the average person? Please place a tick 
next to the rank that you think applies to you. 
 
 
__ 1-4  (very above average)  
__ 5-8  (above average) 
__ 9-12  (average) 
__13-16  (below average) 
__ 17-20  (very below average) 
  
5. We now ask you to choose how you want to be paid: according to option 1 or option 2?   
_____________________ 
6. What was your decision based on? 
 
7. If you chose Option 1, did your decision depend on the payment rate under Option 2? If so, 
what payment rate would have convinced you to choose Option 2? 
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Performance Sheet for Task 2 
 
 
No. of bags filled: _________________________________ 
 
  
Player ID #: ____________________ 
For experimenter use only 
 
Paired Player ID #: _______________ 
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Instructions for Final Payment Determination 
 
We will now determine what task to pay you for. We will flip a coin; you will all be 
paid for task 1 if Heads come and task 2 if Tails come up. 
If Head comes up, then Task 1 is chosen: Each one of you will flip a coin to determine 
whether your investment succeeded or not. If the coin comes up heads, you win four 
times the amount you chose to invest. If it comes up tails, you lose the amount invested.   
If Tail comes up then Task 2 is chosen: We will pay you according to the choice you 
had indicated earlier.  
If you had chosen option 1, we will pay you according to your performance.  
If you had chosen option 2, we will ask you to pick one chit amongst several chits of 
paper on the front desk. Each chit contains an id number of one of the participants. Your 
performance will be matched with the performance of the participant whose ID number 
you picked. You will be paid according to your relative performance as described 
earlier. 
Now we will call each of you one at a time like before. Please take your decision sheets 
with your ID# written on it when you come. 
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Visual Charts 
Figure A1: Slides used in the Investment Game in conjunction with the oral instructions 
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Figure A2: Visual slides used in the Competition Game in conjunction with the oral instructions 
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Appendix 3: Google Map Showing Location of South Shahdara region 
 
